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Comparison and reminding have both been shown to support learning and transfer. Comparison is thought to
support transfer because it allows learners to disregard non-matching features of superficially different episodes in
order to abstract the essential structure of concepts. Remindings promote memory for the individual episodes and
generalization because they prompt learners to retrieve earlier episodes during the encoding of later related episodes and
to compare across episodes. Across three experiments, we compared the consequences of comparison and reminding
on memory and transfer. Participants studied a sequence of related, but superficially different, proverb pairs. In
the comparison condition, participants saw proverb pairs presented together and compared their meaning. In
the reminding condition, participants viewed proverbs one at a time and retrieved any prior studied proverb
that shared the same deep meaning as the current proverb. Experiment 1 revealed that participants in the reminding
condition recalled more proverbs than those in the comparison condition. Experiment 2 showed that the mnemonic
benefits of reminding persisted over a one-week retention interval. Finally, in Experiment 3, we examined the ability of
participants to generalize their remembered information to new items in a task that required participants to identify
unstudied proverbs that shared the same meaning as studied proverbs. Comparison led to worse discrimination between
proverbs related to studied proverbs and proverbs unrelated to studied proverbs than reminding. Reminding supported
better memory for individual instances and transfer to new situations than comparison.Significance
Teachers and instructors aim to support their students’
long-term memories and ability to appropriately transfer
learned information to new contexts. Despite this universal
goal, debate persists about the most effective pedagogies to
foster such retention and generalizability. Across three
experiments, we compared the consequences of two
prominent pedagogies (comparison and reminding) on
memory and transfer. In comparison, for example,
teachers may show two different chemical reactions of
combustion on the screen together and have learners
compare their attributes. This helps learners to
recognize that combustion produces water and carbon
dioxide, regardless of the reactants. In remindings, a
teacher may present the different chemical equations
separated in time. The later related equation may
prompt learners to think back to the earlier similar
equation, retrieve it from memory, and compare
across equations. Both comparison and reminding
have been shown to enhance learning across a variety* Correspondence: jonathantullis@gmail.com
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their relative merits have never been examined. We
compared the benefits of reminding and comparison
in order to determine the most effective pedagogical
tools for educators. Across the three experiments pre-
sented here, reminding supported better memory for
individual examples and enabled more appropriate
transfer to new situations than comparison. Educators,
then, may be able to construct educational materials
and schedules to promote remindings across some
kinds of related information instead of promoting
explicit, simultaneous comparison of related exemplars.
When confident that all students will be able to make the
appropriate connections between related information,
educators can prompt remindings by separating related
information in time and encouraging learners to retrieve
prior related examples.
Background
Creating long-lasting and transferrable knowledge from
individual episodes is important to succeeding in an
ever-changing world. We must apply knowledge gained
in past situations to new and different situations in order
to thrive in a complex world. Making comparisons andis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
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generalizable knowledge from individual episodes.
Comparison has been presented as one of the most
effective means of ensuring that learners generalize
across instances and transfer knowledge to novel
challenges (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Loewenstein, Thompson,
& Gentner, 1999). Similarly, remindings have been shown to
support generalization in problem-solving and category-
learning (Ross, 1984; Ross & Kennedy, 1990). In three exper-
iments, we directly compared the consequences of compari-
sons and remindings on memory and generalization. In the
first two experiments, we analyzed the mnemonic conse-
quences of comparisons and remindings. In the third, we
examined the consequences of comparisons and
remindings on generalization and transfer. To pre-
view, we find mnemonic and transfer benefits of
remindings over comparison in all three experiments.
Comparison
Comparison, the act of examining two like things in
conjunction to assess commonalities and differences
(Namy & Gentner, 2002), is thought to support transfer
by helping learners abstract the key principles and
features of the examples so that knowledge is not overly
tied to narrow contexts (Goldstone, Day, & Son, 2010;
Son, Smith, & Goldstone, 2011). Comparing two exam-
ples of a concept can highlight their shared relational
structures so that learners can disregard superficial
features and create generalized conceptual knowledge
(Gentner & Markman, 1997). Focusing on the structural
features of a concept while discounting the superficial
features is theorized to support students’ ability to apply
that knowledge in new examples and settings.
The benefits of comparison on many different aspects
of learning are well established (Gentner & Markman,
1995; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Loewenstein et al., 1999).
Crucially, comparison promotes abstraction of general-
ized knowledge and transfer to novel situations (Gentner
& Namy, 1999; Loewenstein et al., 1999; Thompson,
Gentner, & Loewenstein, 2000). For example, learners
who compare examples are more likely to describe
concepts in general terms, rather than connected to the
contexts of the examples (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989;
Gick & Holyoak, 1983). The benefits of comparison
extend beyond the creation of generalized knowledge.
Comparison promotes the understanding of both indi-
vidual cases involved (Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 2001),
produces large gains in procedural knowledge and flexi-
bility in problem-solving (Rittle-Johnson & Star, 2007),
and enhances discrimination between problem categories
(Cummins, 1992; VanderStoep & Seifert, 1993). Compari-
son even prepares people to learn more from future direct
instruction than studying individual cases (Schwartz &
Bransford, 1998). Benefits of comparison have been shownacross a variety of domains, including math (Ross &
Kennedy, 1990), biology (Glynn & Takahashi, 1998), phys-
ics (Kurtz et al., 2001), and spatial mapping (Loe-
wenstein & Gentner, 2001), across a wide range of
ages (Gentner & Namy, 1999; Loewenstein & Gen-
tner, 2001), and across long retention intervals (Chen
& Klahr, 1999).
Remindings
Remindings, stimulus driven retrievals of past spe-
cific episodes, allow learners to notice and identify
common characteristics of related stimuli across time
and distance (Benjamin & Ross, 2010). Remindings
may prompt learners to recognize meaningful pat-
terns across experiences in order to categorize new
instances, generate inferences, and solve unfamiliar
problems (Hintzman, 2010). Remindings may allow
us to compare sequentially distant instances of a cat-
egory in order to distinguish critical commonalities
from irrelevant differences, generalize across events,
and contrast between examples (Benjamin & Tullis,
2010). For example, when we study a new exemplar
of a category, it may remind us of a previous
specific instance we have seen, prompt us to identify
commonalities between the stored and triggering
event, and change what we believe is central to
category membership (Ross, Perkins, & Tenpenny,
1990). More concretely, bird watchers may see a
new bird, which reminds them of a prior bird that
they have seen. The shape of their beaks may be
similar, so they recognize this as an important part
of the category, but their colors may differ, so the
birders disregard this trait. Theories of reminding
suggest that the effortful memory retrieval of the
first presentation during the second presentation
enhances memory for the first presentation (Tullis,
Benjamin, & Ross, 2014), enables comparison be-
tween the two episodes, and fosters generalizations as
a result of that comparison process (Ross & Kennedy,
1990).
Remindings are thought to support memory and a
wide variety of additional higher order cognitive skills.
Within memory research, remindings have been shown
to enhance memory for the first instance in a related
pair (Tullis, Benjamin, et al., 2014; Tullis, Braverman,
Ross, & Benjamin, 2014). Further, remindings benefit re-
cency judgments (Hintzman, 2010; Tzeng & Cotton,
1980; Winograd & Soloway, 1985), spacing judgments
(Friedman & Janssen, 2010; Hintzman, Block, & Summers,
1973; Hintzman, Summers, & Block, 1975), and judg-
ments of frequency (Hintzman, 2004). Not only do
remindings benefit mnemonic performance, they also
support a wide range of higher order cognitive skills,
including classification of new items (Medin & Schaffer,
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ambiguous events (Ross & Bradshaw, 1994; Tullis,
Braverman, et al., 2014), and generalization across
episodes (Ross & Kennedy, 1990).
Comparison versus remindings
Given the respective cognitive advantages for compari-
son and reminding, it is natural to wonder which
process will provide greater benefits in which contexts.
As a motivating example, imagine a teacher trying to
teach her students about the general notion of a positive
feedback loop. One possible recommendation, based on
the advantages of explicit comparison, would be for her
to present to students two examples of positive feed-
back: (1) a microphone feeding into, and placed near, a
loudspeaker; and (2) children in a summer camp buying
a particular brand of doll that other children in the
camp had already purchased. She would then ask her
students to notice the similarities between the two
scenarios, with the hope that the comparison will high-
light their deep similarity—the presence of an attribute
in a system variable leads to further increase of the same
attribute. A second possible recommendation, based on
the advantages of reminding, would be for her to present
one of the scenarios on Monday and the second on
Tuesday, without ever juxtaposing them, with the hope
that students will be reminded of Monday’s scenario
when presented with Tuesday’s scenario, and once so
reminded, will retrieve and strengthen the aspects of
Monday’s scenario that match Tuesday’s. When are the
advantages of students actively being reminded of a
previous scenario sufficiently strong to justify with-
holding the previous scenario for direct and simultaneous
comparison when the second situation is presented?
Experiments 1 and 2 explore this question with respect to
memory for the scenarios themselves, whereas Experi-
ment 3 examines generalization to new examples of the
principle.
Both comparison and reminding approaches ultimately
suggest that benefits arise from comparing across indi-
vidual episodes, but the benefits arise from different pro-
cesses. Comparison de-emphasizes individual examples.
Learners who are engaged in comparison are hypothe-
sized to emphasize the structural commonalities across
instances and downplay unique superficial features be-
longing to only example, promoting generalized knowledge.
The advantages of comparison arise because learners are
less likely to tie the general concepts to the particular con-
texts or specific episodes. Remindings, on the other hand,
depend upon remembering the specific individual episodes.
Learners cannot be reminded of earlier episodes if they
have forgotten them (Benjamin & Tullis, 2010).
Another central difference between approaches is
simultaneous versus sequential presentation of examples.The comparison process benefits from the simultaneous
presentation of two distinct episodes in order to facilitate
alignment between them, while reminding relies upon
learners to actively retrieve the first episode from memory
when triggered by the second. Invoking practice retrieval
(Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) and generation effects
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978) reminding theory suggests that
the effortful retrieval of the first example during the
presentation of the second creates the mnemonic benefits
of remindings (Benjamin & Tullis, 2010). The benefits of
remindings are contingent upon successful noticing
and retrieval of the relevant prior knowledge during
the processing of a later related episode. Successful
retrieval of the earlier information is required before
learners can compare and generalize across the epi-
sodes. For example, when people notice the relation-
ship between a current item and prior information,
memory for that prior information is enhanced; however,
when people fail to notice that relationship, the later item
can interfere with memory for the earlier item (Bellezza,
Winkler, & Andrasik, 1975; Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Kelley,
2015; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013). Noticing and retrieving
prior related information during the processing of other
examples often proves to be a significant obstacle
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1990; Gick & Holyoak, 1983).
Across three experiments, we examined how compari-
son and remindings (1) impact memory for individual
instances in related pairs and (2) foster generalized
knowledge. Comparison should focus learners’ attention
on the commonalities across episodes and support the
creation of abstract, generalized knowledge, but may
hamper memory for the individual episodes. Alterna-
tively, if learners retrieve appropriate prior episodes
during the presentation of later related episodes,
remindings should benefit both memory for individual
episodes and generalization across those episodes. The
mnemonic and generalization consequences of compari-
son and remindings will be directly contrasted here.Experiment 1
In this first experiment, we contrasted memory for the
individual episodes across a comparison group and a
reminding group. Learners studied a list of proverb
pairs. In the reminding condition, we prompted partic-
ipants to “look back” through the studied list for a
proverb that shared the same meaning as the current
one, as has been done in reminding research (Jacoby
et al., 2015; Wahlheim & Jacoby, 2013; Wahlheim,
Maddox, & Jacoby, 2013). In the comparison condi-
tion, participants were given two proverbs and asked
to compare their meaning. Insomuch as comparison
fosters general, abstract knowledge over memory for
the individual instances, we expect that reminding




Thirty introductory psychology students at Indiana
University participated in exchange for partial course
credit. Thirty additional participants were tested through
Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for $1.00. Finally,
41 participants from the University of Arizona commu-
nity were recruited through fliers on campus and were
paid $10 per hour of participation. The power to detect
a large effect size (large effect size f = 0.25) for a three-
way interaction for 101 participants is 0.98 (Cohen,
1988; GPower, 2016). The power to detect a large effect
size for repeated measures ANOVA within each separate
condition is 0.94 (Cohen, 1988; GPower, 2016).
Materials
A total of 30 pairs of proverbs were gathered from
Markman, Taylor, and Gentner (2007), adapted from
various websites about foreign proverbs, or were created.
Each proverb pair shared a deep meaning, but varied in
superficial features. The proverbs are provided in the
Appendix.
Design
The experiment manipulated one variable between partic-
ipants (condition: reminding versus comparison) and two
variables within participants (related versus unrelated
pairs and position within a pair: P1 versus P2). Partici-
pants were alternatively assigned to the reminding and
comparison conditions. In the reminding condition,
learners studied a single proverb at a time and were asked
to type any prior studied proverb that shared the same
meaning as the current one. In the comparison condition,
learners viewed two proverbs simultaneously and were
asked to type a comparison or generalization across the
two proverbs if appropriate. Proverb pairs were randomly
assigned to the related or unrelated conditions within each
condition. On related trials, both proverbs with the same
meaning were presented on the screen together (compari-
son condition) or were both presented within the study
list (reminding condition). On unrelated trials, two unre-
lated proverbs from two different proverb pairs were ran-
domly paired together and presented like the related pairs.
Proverbs in the unrelated condition never shared their
meaning with any other proverb in the study list. Finally,
each proverb was randomly assigned to be presented first
(P1) or second (P2) within the pair. In the comparison
condition, P1s and P2s were presented on the screen
together, but P1s were presented above P2s. In the
reminding condition, P2s appeared 2 items after P1s.Procedure
The experiment was programmed using Collector soft-
ware (Garcia, 2015). In this and all following experiments,
participants first read and signed a consent form. Partici-
pants in the lab completed the experiment across ten
different computers in individual testing booths. Partici-
pants were alternatively assigned to either the reminding
or comparison conditions. Participants in the reminding
condition were instructed: “You will see a series of prov-
erbs presented one at a time. For each proverb, if you have
already studied a proverb that has the same MEANING as
the current one, please type it in.” If they could not think
of any prior proverb that had the same meaning, they
were asked to type in “None.” The next proverb was pre-
sented after the participants entered a response for the
current trial. The lag between presentations of proverb
pairs was one intervening item. Participants in the com-
parison condition were instructed that they would view
two proverbs simultaneously. For each pair, they were
asked to type in a comparison or generalization about the
meaning of the pair of proverbs. The participants were
instructed to type in “None” if they could not derive a
comparison or generalization across the pair. Participants
in both conditions viewed ten related and ten unrelated
proverb pairs. After finishing the study phase, all partici-
pants played 3 min of Tetris. Finally, all participants
engaged in a surprise free recall test, where they were
asked to type in any proverbs they remembered from the
study list. Participants were required to spend at least
2 min recalling proverbs before they could choose to end
the recall phase.
Results
Proverb recall was scored by three independent re-
searchers; coders agreed on 98% of the recalled items.
For the 2% of recalled items that were coded differently,
scores were assigned based upon the majority of the
coders. All patterns of results were similar across all
three groups of participants (all ps > 0.05). Therefore, we
did not differentiate between type of participants in any
of our analyses.
To verify that later related proverbs reminded learners
of previously studied proverbs, we first calculated how
frequently related and unrelated P1s and P2s reminded
learners of previously studied proverbs within the
reminding condition. The proportion of each type of
proverb that reminded learners of earlier proverbs is dis-
played in Fig. 1. A 2 (position) × 2 (relatedness) ANOVA
on the proportion of proverbs that reminded learners of
earlier proverbs showed a significant two-way interaction
(F(1, 50) = 140.79, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.74), a main effect of
position (F(1, 50) = 176.05, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.78), and a
main effect of relatedness (F(1, 50) = 56.19, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.53). Follow-up t-tests showed that related P2s served
Fig. 1 The proportion of studied proverbs that reminded learners of
earlier studied proverbs in the reminding condition. Error bars indicate
one standard error of the mean above and below the mean
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= 10.83, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.53), but related P1s
served as reminders less often than unrelated P1s
(t(50) = 3.53, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.48). Of the related
P2s that reminded participants of earlier proverbs, 69%
reminded participants of the earlier proverb that shared
the same deep meaning. This suggests that the relation-
ships between proverbs supported reminders to appropri-
ate earlier proverbs.
We also calculated how often participants in the
comparison condition created a generalization com-
pared to how often they said entered “None” because
they could not create a generalization. Participants
created a generalization across two proverbs moreFig. 2 The proportion of studied proverbs recalled based upon relatedness
condition (right) in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate one standard error of toften when the proverbs were related (M = 0.94 [SD
= 0.11]) than when they were unrelated (M = 0.36
[SD = 0.36]; t(49) = 10.55, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.51).
The proportion of proverbs recalled is displayed in Fig. 2.
A 2 (position) × 2 (relatedness) × 2 (reminding versus
comparison) ANOVA on proportion recalled revealed a
significant three-way interaction (F(1, 99) = 11.97, p =
0.001, ηp
2 = 0.11). The position by condition interaction
reached significance (F(1,99) = 4.71, p = 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.04),
but no other interactions reached significance. The
ANOVA further revealed simple main effects of position
(F(1, 99) = 9.61, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.09) and relatedness (F(1,
99) = 13.19, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.12), such that first items in a
pair (P1) were remembered better than second items (P2)
and related items were remembered better than unrelated
items. Finally, participants in the reminding group recalled
more items than those in the comparison group (F(1, 99)
= 13.25, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.12).
Finally, we compared the time spent per each proverb,
as participants self-paced through the list of proverbs in
each condition. In the comparison condition, we divided
each trial time by 2 because two proverbs were presented
during each trial. Participants in the compare condition
spent 16.20 s [SD = 12.17] studying each proverb, while
participants in the remind condition spent only 13.82 s
[SD = 6.73] studying each proverb. The difference in study
time between conditions did not reach significance
(t(100) = 1.20, p = 0.23, Cohen’s d = 0.24) and was in the
direction opposite that of recall performance.
Discussion
Participants accurately connected proverb pairs that
shared a deep meaning. Participants were reminded
more often of prior proverbs that shared the same
meaning than prior unrelated instances. Participants inand study position in the reminding condition (left) and comparison
he mean above and below the mean
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frequently when the proverbs shared the same meaning.
Participants understood the deep meanings of the prov-
erbs and often relied upon them to make connections
between superficially different proverbs.
Participants in the reminding condition remembered
more proverbs than those in the comparison condition.
Prompting learners to think back through the study list
and retrieve prior related proverbs produced better
memory than prompting learners to compare two
proverbs. Further, participants in the reminding condi-
tion were more efficient as they recalled more items, but
spent less overall time studying the proverbs. The
mnemonic benefits in the reminding condition are par-
ticularly prominent for the first items in related pairs.
The mnemonic advantage for related P1s over unrelated
P1s replicates research using different materials and con-
texts and has been labeled the “reminding effect” (Tullis,
Benjamin, et al., 2014). The specificity of the benefits to
P1 (and not P2) likely arose because the effortful re-
trieval of P1 during P2 enhanced later retrieval of P1.
An alternative explanation of the benefits seen in the
reminding condition is that participants may have
encoded the proverbs more deeply initially and the final
test reflects differential encoding practices. The results
of Experiment 1 suggest that reminding instructions
may contribute to the mnemonic differences between
conditions, but also shows that the reminding condition
entails more than just deeper initial encoding. Partici-
pants in Experiment 1 remembered more unrelated
proverbs than participants in the comparison condition,
which supports the idea that reminding instructions
improved overall encoding. This is particularly interesting
because comparison participants spent numerically more
time studying the proverbs than the reminding partici-
pants. However, the specificity of mnemonic benefits to
related P1s shows that reminding instructions do not
prompt learners to more deeply encode all the stimuli as
compared to the comparison condition. Remindings
specifically benefit memory for the first instances in re-
lated pairs, which suggests that the large mnemonic con-
sequences of remindings arise from retrieval of the first
presentation during encoding of the later related episode.
We find no evidence that comparison promotes for-
getting of individual instances. In fact, we find some evi-
dence that comparing related items promotes memory
for those items more than comparing unrelated items.
Participants in the comparison condition mostly created
generalizations across related pairs and more items from
related pairs were remembered than from unrelated
pairs. Comparing across similar instances seemed to
enhance memory for the individual items in a compari-
son more than across dissimilar instances. This suggests
that participants are encoding the individual instances inrelated pairs, even though they create a generalization.
However, the mnemonic benefits of comparison are
much smaller than those of reminding.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined memory performance
after a longer retention interval in order to assess
whether the mnemonic advantage of reminding over
comparison persists over time. Participants completed a
recognition memory test one week after they studied the
sequence of proverbs. Further, the recognition test was
designed to assess whether comparison participants re-
membered the general principles of proverbs, but forgot
the specific episodes. The recognition test in Experiment
2 included proverbs that were never studied but shared
the same meaning as a pair of studied proverbs. In Ex-
periment 1, the reminding group may have benefited be-
cause their encoding phase was very similar to their
testing phase: they typed in specific proverbs during
both study and test. Experiment 2 suffers less from this
concern because the final memory test involved recogni-
tion (and not recall), where learners did not type in any
proverbs and which likely relied upon different aspects
of memory than recall.
Methods
Participants
Eighty participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk com-
pleted the first part of the experiment for $0.75. Partici-
pants were contacted one week later and asked to
complete the second part of the experiment for $1.25.
Sixty-nine participants finished the second part of the
experiment. We only analyzed data from the 69 partici-
pants who completed both portions of the experiment in
our analyses. Our power to detect large sized effects
(effect size d = 0.8) using two-tailed t-tests between the
two conditions (Cohen, 1988; GPower, 2016) with 69
participants is 0.93. For repeated measures t-tests within
each condition, our power to detect large effects is 0.96.
Materials
The 30 pairs of proverbs from Experiment 1 were
expanded to 40 triplets of proverbs. Forty triplets of
proverbs were gathered from various websites, books of
foreign translations of proverbs, or were created. Each
triplet shared a similar deep meaning, but varied in
superficial features. Six proverbs unrelated to any of the
triplets were also gathered to be used as filler items.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to reminding and
comparison conditions. The study phase was similar to
Experiment 1, but the composition of the study list
differed. Participants studied 20 pairs of related proverbs
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were randomly assigned to be studied or unstudied. For
the studied triplets, two out of three proverbs were
randomly selected to be studied and the study order of
the two studied proverbs was randomized. As in Experi-
ment 1, proverb pairs in the reminding condition were
separated by one intervening proverb. The position of
each proverb pair within the study list was random.
The testing procedure differed largely from Experiment 1.
Learners were given a recognition test that included ten
studied P1 proverbs (studied items), ten unstudied proverbs
that shared the same deep meaning as a studied pair (un-
studied, but related), and 20 unstudied proverbs that were
not related to any studied proverb (unstudied and unre-
lated). One proverb from each unstudied triplet was
randomly chosen to be on the list of the 20 unstudied, unre-
lated proverbs. Only studied P1s (and not studied P2s) were
included within the recognition test because present-
ing proverbs to participants during a recognition test
may impact their later recognition of related proverbs
(Tullis, Benjamin, et al., 2014).
Procedure
The study phase was very similar to Experiment 1, except
that only three out of the 23 studied pairs of proverbs were
unrelated. The retention interval was increased to one week
to assess the persistence of mnemonic benefits. Participants
were contacted through email one week after they com-
pleted the study phase and were asked to complete the final
recognition test to earn an additional $1.25. During the rec-
ognition test, proverbs were presented one at a time and
participants judged them as either “studied” or “unstudied”
from the first part of the experiment.
Results
First, we analyzed how likely P1s and P2s reminded
learners of earlier studied proverbs for the reminding
group of participants. P2s were more likely to remindFig. 3 The proportion of proverbs that participants endorsed as having be
false alarms are shown on the right. Error bars indicate one standard error olearners of a previous proverb (M= 0.66 [SD = 0.22]) than
were P1s (M = 0.11 [SD = 0.10]; t(33) = 12.96, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 2.26). Of the P2s that served as reminders,
85% reminded participants of the earlier proverb that
shared the same deep meaning. For participants in the
comparison condition, we calculated how often they cre-
ated a generalization across the related items and across
the unrelated filler pairs. Participants generalized across
84% (SD = 0.24) of the related proverb pairs, but only 19%
(SD = 0.26) of the unrelated filler pairs.
The proportion of proverbs that participants endorsed
as having been studied is displayed in Fig. 3. Participants
in the reminding condition had fewer false alarms to
unstudied, but related proverbs than participants in the
comparison condition (t(67) = 2.62, p = 0.01, Cohen’s d =
0.68), but there were no significant differences in false
alarms to unstudied, unrelated proverbs (t(67) = 1.50, p
= 0.14, Cohen’s d = 0.37) or in hits (t(67) = 0.83, p = 0.41,
Cohen’s d = 0.21). We combined the hits to studied
proverbs and false alarms to the unstudied, but related
proverbs into signal detection theoretic measures of
memory performance (d’ and C; Green & Swets, 1966).
Floor and ceiling performance was corrected by adding
or subtracting half an item (Green & Swets, 1966).
Participants in the reminding condition had greater
discrimination between studied and unstudied, related
items (M = 2.00 [SD = 0.77]) than participants in the
comparison condition (M = 1.45 [SD = 0.91]; t(67) = 2.64,
p = 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.65). No significant differences
were found between the criteria used to endorse prov-
erbs between the reminding group (M = 0.28 [SD =
0.49]) and comparison group (M = 0.19 [SD = 0.48];
t(67) = 0.79, p = 0.43, Cohen’s D = 0.19).
Finally, we compared the time each participant spent
studying each proverb. As in Experiment 1, partici-
pants in the compare condition spent 23.56 s [SD =
20.10] per proverb, while participants in the remind
condition spent only 17.64 s [SD = 10.60] per proverb.en studied in Experiment 2. Hits are shown on in the left panel and
f the mean above and below the mean
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not reach significance (t(67) = 1.50, p = 0.14, Cohen’s d
= 0.37) and was in the direction opposite that of final
recall performance.Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated and extended Experiment 1.
During encoding, learners in the reminding group were
able to successfully connect two superficially different
proverbs that shared the same deep meaning, as indi-
cated by the high rate with which P2 reminded learners
of P1. Further, reminding led to better memory per-
formance than comparison, even after a one-week re-
tention interval. Participants in the reminding condition
were better able to discriminate between studied and
unstudied proverbs than participants in the comparison
condition. Comparison led to lower hit rates of studied
proverbs and higher false alarms to all unstudied prov-
erbs. Participants in the reminding condition were also
more efficient at their memory processes; they spent
less time but had better recognition performance than
those in the comparison condition.
If comparison created abstracted knowledge about the
principles put forth by proverb pairs, participants in the
comparison group would have shown selectively higher
false alarms to unstudied but related proverbs than the
reminding group. Some evidence supports this hypoth-
esis. A 2 (condition) × 2 (type of false alarm) ANOVA
on proportion of false alarms revealed a significant
interaction (F(1, 67) = 4.42, p = 0.04, ηp
2 = 0.06) and main
effects of condition (F(1, 67) = 5.50, p = 0.02, ηp
2 = 0.07)
and type of false alarm (F(1, 67) = 32.46, p < 0.01, ηp
2 =
0.33). The interaction indicates that comparison pro-
duced selectively more false alarms to unstudied, but re-
lated proverbs than did reminding. Comparison, then,
may promote memory for generalizations of meaning
across proverbs at the expense of memory for individual
instances. However, we must be cautious with the inter-
pretation of these data because scaling issues (i.e. floor
effects) may be driving this interaction.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 show that reminding
supports better memory performance than comparison. In
the reminding group, learners had to actively think back and
retrieve prior related episodes. Remindings prompted
learners to practice retrieval of a prior episode at a time
when the prior episode could be recalled, re-exposed
learners to the earlier episode, and supported long-term re-
tention of that information. Comparison may have empha-
sized generalization at the expense of memory for the
specific episodes. Results seem to suggest that participants
in the comparison condition focused on abstracting a
generalization from the two proverbs without encoding each
proverb deeply.Experiment 3
Comparison is thought to primarily benefit generalization
and transfer, while the benefits of reminding may primarily
involve verbatim memory. Indeed, Experiments 1 and 2
showed that reminding promoted better memory perform-
ance for individual episodes than comparison. In Experi-
ment 3, we extended beyond basic memory tasks and
examined how well reminding and comparison supported
transfer to new items sharing deep meanings with studied
items. Transfer is thought to be one of the primary benefits
of comparison. However, remindings are also thought to
promote transfer, as a learner retrieves the prior episode
when prompted by a later episode, compares the two, and
generalizes across them. Further, practice retrieval can sup-
port performance on near transfer tasks (Butler, 2010;
Rohrer, Taylor, & Sholar, 2010). During the test in Experi-
ment 3, participants were presented with proverbs that
were not studied and were asked to identify those that
shared a meaning with any studied proverb. We compared
the benefits of remindings and comparison in this near
transfer task, as learners used the memory for the principle
of studied proverbs to recognize and classify new, unstud-
ied proverbs (Barnett & Ceci, 2002).
Methods
Participants
Forty-six participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk
completed the experiment for $1.00. The power to
detect large effect sizes (effect size = 0.8) between the
conditions with two-tailed t-tests for 46 participants is
0.87 (Cohen, 1988; GPower, 2016). The power to detect
large effect sizes from repeated measures within each
condition with two-tailed t-tests is 0.90.
Materials
The same 40 triplets of proverbs from Experiment 2
were used.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the reminding
and comparison conditions. The study phase was identi-
cal to Experiment 2, but the test phase differed. After
the study phase, participants played Tetris for 3 min.
Then, participants were presented with a list of 40
unstudied proverbs one at a time. Half of the proverbs
in the test list shared a deep meaning with a pair that
had been studied and half were unrelated to any that
had been studied. Participants were asked to endorse
any proverbs that shared the same meaning as any of
the proverbs that they studied.
Results
We first analyzed the proportion of P1s and P2s that
reminded participants of earlier proverbs within the
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proverbs more often (M= 0.73 [SD = 0.22]) than P1s (M=
0.08 [SD = 0.07]; t(21) = 14.94, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.26).
Of the P2s that reminded participants of earlier proverbs,
94% reminded participants of the earlier proverb that
shared the same deep meaning. We calculated how often
participants in the comparison condition created a
generalization across the related proverb pairs and across
the unrelated filler pairs. Participants generalized across
89% (SD = 0.15) of the related proverb pairs, but only 35%
(SD = 0.34) of the unrelated filler pairs.
The proportion of proverbs that participants endorsed as
being related to ones studied is displayed in Fig. 4. Partici-
pants in the reminding condition endorsed fewer unrelated
proverbs than participants in the comparison condition
(t(42) = 3.96, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.19), but there were no
differences in the endorsement of proverbs related to studied
ones (t(42) = 0.38, p= 0.71, Cohen’s d = 0.09). We computed
signal detection theoretic measures of discrimination and
bias in participants’ responses by considering “yes” responses
to related proverbs to be hits and “yes” responses to unre-
lated proverbs to be false alarms (Green & Swets, 1966).
Participants in the reminding group better discriminated be-
tween related and unrelated proverbs (M= 1.53 [SD= 0.80])
than those in the comparison group (M=1.00 [SD= 0.85];
t(44) = 2.11, p= 0.04, Cohen’s d = 0.65). Further, participants
in the reminding group had a more conservative criterion
(M= 0.24 [SD= 0.40]) than those in the comparison group
(M=−0.16 [SD= 0.47]; t(44) = 3.01, p= 0.004, Cohen’s d =
0.92).
Finally, we analyzed the time devoted to studying each
proverb in each condition. As in the prior two experiments,Fig. 4 The proportion of related and unrelated proverbs endorsed in
Experiment 3. Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean
above and below the meanparticipants in the reminding condition spent less time (M
= 16.16 [SD = 7.26]) per proverb than participants in the
comparison condition (M= 19.00 [SD = 12.24]), but this
difference did not reach significance (t(44) = 0.36, p = 0.92,
Cohen’s d = 0.28).
Discussion
Participants in the reminding condition more appropriately
generalized and transferred their experiences to a new situ-
ation than participants in the comparison group. Compari-
son did not increase the hit rate to proverbs related to
studied items, but almost doubled the false alarm rate to
items that were not related to studied items. Consequently,
comparison resulted in worse discrimination between prov-
erbs that were related to studied items and proverbs that
were unrelated to studied items. Comparison also resulted
in a more liberal criterion for participants’ endorsement.
Comparison did not support participants’ encoding of the
studied principles or examples and seems to have prompted
learners to overgeneralize the abstractions they created
during the encoding phase. Reminding led to better transfer
of studied principles to new situations and contexts than
comparison. Participants in the reminding performed better
on the transfer task than participants in the comparison
condition. This is especially surprising because the study
and test conditions were more similar for the comparison
group than the reminding group: participants in the com-
parison group typed in themes during study and identified
old proverb themes during the final test, while participants
in the reminding condition typed in specific proverbs
during study but identified old proverb themes during the
final test. It is compelling that participants in the compari-
son group studied more similarly to how they were tested,
but performed worse on the final task than participants in
the reminding group.
Learners could have succeeded in the transfer task by
remembering the general principles they abstracted from
individual instances or by remembering and generalizing an
individual instance. Research suggests that learners can
succeed in new situations by applying generalized abstract
knowledge (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) or by applying a specific
prior instance (Ross, 1984). Therefore, remembering
distinct prior episodes may be advantageous when trying to
transfer knowledge to a new situation, as long as those
prior episodes are not too tightly connected to the prior
context. Reminding through structural similarities may pro-
mote both memory for the individual instances and the
general principles that connect different episodes. Partici-
pants must abstract the deep meaning of the proverbs to
create connections between them and the retrieval of the
earlier episode during later presentations likely supports
memory for the instances and the generalization. These
results suggest that, relative to reminding, comparison may
only support immediate generalization and not long-term
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participants create during comparison (and the individual
instances compared) may be forgotten more quickly than
during reminding so that participants perform poorly on
later memory and transfer tasks.
General discussion
Across three experiments, we compared the mnemonic and
transfer consequences of comparison with those of remind-
ing. In the first two experiments, reminding led to better
memory for the individual instances than comparison.
However, Experiments 1 and 2 suffer from the limitation
that learners in the reminding group may have been using
similar mental processes involving memory during both
encoding and test. Because the mental processes during
study and test may be more similar for the reminding group
than comparison group, it may not be surprising that
encoding through reminding is more beneficial for memory
than encoding through comparison. In the last experiment,
though, reminding showed cognitive benefits beyond just
pure memory. Experiment 3 showed that reminding led to
better generalization and transfer of that knowledge to a
new situation. Learners who were in the reminding group
more appropriately recognized proverbs that shared the
same meaning as ones they had studied. Reminding not
only supported memory, but also fostered appropriate
transfer to new situations.
Comparison has been described as one of the most
effective techniques to create generalized, transferrable
knowledge (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Hummel &
Holyoak, 1997). Yet, here we show that remindings led
to better transfer than comparison. Our reminding task
employs several well-documented cognitive principles to
result in the mnemonic and transfer benefits showcased
across the three experiments. First, we prompted learners
to actively think back to proverbs that shared similar struc-
tural meanings with the current proverb, rather than earlier
proverbs with similar superficial features. This likely
encouraged learners to encode each proverb according to
its deep meaning so that they could make connections
between the current instance and future structurally similar
instances. Encoding the proverbs in structural ways makes
learners more likely to be able to later retrieve the example
when they encounter a later analogous item (Loewenstein,
2010). Further, telling learners that prior instances are
related to current items dramatically increases how much
learners use prior examples to solve current ones (Gick &
Holyoak, 1983). By giving learners a “hint” to look back
through the study list, we likely increased the number of
connections made between superficially different but deeply
related proverbs. As learners look back through the study
list, they bring together physically and temporally disparate
events, the events become mentally contiguous, and
learners can generalize across them.Second, the reminding procedure forced learners to
effortfully think back to and retrieve similar instances. The ef-
fortful retrieval of earlier episodes largely benefits memory for
the retrieved episode (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). The
mnemonic benefits, especially for related P1s in the remind-
ing condition, are likely due to practice retrieval. The presen-
tation of a related P2 allows learners to practice retrieving P1
before P1 is completely forgotten. Successful practice retrieval
of P1 ensures that memory for that prior item will persist
over longer periods of time (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006).
Practice retrieving has even been shown to benefit transfer of
knowledge to new situations, tests, and contexts (Butler,
2010; Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Coane, 2010; Rohrer et al., 2010).
Remindings, then, likely engender practice retrieval and,
therefore, support learners’ memories of the exact studied
items and learners’ generalization of studied information
to new situations. Further, the separation of instances re-
quired for remindings likely takes advantage of the spacing
effect, whereby repetitions presented spaced apart in time
are remembered better than repetitions presented massed
together (Benjamin & Tullis, 2010; Hintzman, 1974).
Third, our reminding procedure involved interleaving ex-
emplars from different pairs. In the reminding condition, the
structurally related pairs were separated by an intervening
item from a structurally different pair. Interleaving exemplars
from different categories can lead to enhanced memory for
the items and superior category learning (Kornell & Bjork,
2008; Rawson, Thomas, & Jacoby, 2015). The benefits of
interleaving exemplars from different categories is thought to
arise because learners can better discriminate among cat-
egories when they are intermixed (Birnbaum, Kornell, Bjork,
& Bjork, 2013; Kang & Pashler, 2012) to the degree that the
categories are similar to each other (Carvalho & Goldstone,
2014). Reminding intermixes stimuli so that learners can
compare and contrast between different pairs of proverbs,
while the comparison process reduces the likelihood that
learners compare across pairs. Interleaving, then, may cause
the generalizations that arise through the reminding
process to be appropriately broad.
Making physically separate events mentally contiguous
through controlled memory search may be important to
form complex memory traces involving both events (Jacoby,
1974). Hintzman (2011) argues that these complex memory
traces incorporate the earlier stimuli into the representations
of the later episode through recursive reminding and this in-
corporation results in the mnemonic benefits seen for related
items. However, making related proverbs contiguous cannot
be the fundamental cause of the benefits of reminding. Re-
lated proverbs in the comparison condition were both men-
tally and physically contiguous, yet were not remembered as
well or transferred as appropriately. It seems likely, then, that
the benefits of the practice retrieval that enables events to
become mentally contiguous underlies the significant
mnemonic benefits apparent in remindings.
Tullis and Goldstone Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:20 Page 11 of 14Remindings may be most beneficial when learners can
extract the deep structure of episodes and connect across
superficially different instances. Comparison may be more
beneficial in situations where learners need more explicit
prompting to connect across very different individual
instances. Further, comparison may be more beneficial with
complex stimuli. In most applications of comparison during
learning, the instances are presented simultaneously, so the
learner does not need to occupy working memory with the
retrieval of a prior episode during the presentation of a sec-
ond. However, in remindings, learners need to retrieve the
prior instance into working memory during presentation of
the second item. Remindings, then, may require more
working memory than comparison. As the to-be-learned
information becomes more complex, space in working
memory is likely at a premium and remindings may require
more working memory than is available.
Many factors varied across the reminding and compari-
son conditions. Alternative experiments could have more
rigidly controlled the similarities between the two condi-
tions to isolate the factors causing differences between the
conditions; however, controlling for those differences ob-
scures the naturalistic integrity of the two conditions for
real-world applications and implementation. For example,
related proverbs in the reminding condition were separated
by intervening unrelated proverbs while related proverbs in
the comparison were simultaneously presented. Attempting
to control for the simultaneous versus sequential presenta-
tion of exemplars would weaken the external validity of our
procedures. The conditions we selected help answer the
real-world question: if you have a limited amount of time
to study related material, should you capitalize on the bene-
fits of reminding or comparison? These results suggest that
the benefits of reminding can outweigh those of compari-
son, at least for these stimuli.
How well the mnemonic and generalization benefits of
reminding apply to different category structures and more
complex materials, like complicated physics problems,
remains unknown. Learners, especially novices, do retrieve
and use prior problems when attempting to solve novel
problems (Pirolli & Anderson, 1985; Reed, Dempster, &
Ettinger, 1985). Learners need to recognize the deep struc-
ture of the problem before they can connect current prob-
lems with structurally similar prior problems. Without
understanding structural similarities, learners often connect
superficially similar problems that may not share deep struc-
ture (Ross, 1984). Further, the kind of information that is
recalled from the prior problem during the presentation of
the second likely changes what information is ultimately re-
membered and generalized. If learners primarily recall
superficial features, without accessing deep structure, only
memory for those superficial features may be enhanced.
Ross (1987), however, suggests that remindings across prob-
lems can support access to the formula used to solve theprior problem. If an appropriate reminding supports
retrieval of the formula, memory for that formula would
likely be strongly enhanced.
The relationship between related exemplars and among
the different related pairs may also moderate the advantages
of remindings over comparison. Category learning research
has examined how with-in and between-category similarity
affects the advantages of comparison. Learners benefit from
actively contrasting between confusable categories, but do
not benefit much from contrasting distinct categories
(Carvalho & Goldstone, 2014; Kornell & Bjork, 2008). For
example, presenting two exemplars from confusable cat-
egories simultaneously can support memory for those exem-
plars and classification of later novel category members
because it enables learners to discriminate between categor-
ies (Wahlheim, Dunlosky, & Jacoby, 2011). Here, however,
we may find no mnemonic advantage of presenting exem-
plars from different categories together on the screen, as
compared to presenting exemplars from the same category
together or to presenting exemplars sequentially. The struc-
ture of our categories (each pair of related proverbs) may be
low in with-in category similarity but high in between-
category discriminability, such that comparison does not
benefit category learning. Further, the structure of categories
may determine the relative effectiveness of comparison and
reminding. The benefits of remindings are likely limited by
the probability of being reminded across instances. If cat-
egories have low within-category similarity, remindings may
be very unlikely to occur and comparison may result in bet-
ter learning and transfer than remindings.
Reminding may prove to be a desirable difficulty
(Schmidt & Bjork, 1992), as compared to comparison. Com-
parison may allow for learners to abstract general principles
from individual instances without much mental effort. With
reminding, learners have to effortfully retrieve a prior related
instance during the presentation of a temporally distant in-
stance. This effortful retrieval supports memory for the first
instance in a related pair (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006; Tullis,
Benjamin, et al., 2014). Further, retrieving the first instance
during the presentation of the second allows the learner to
compare across the instances and create generalized know-
ledge across the episodes. Remindings seem to both en-
hance memory for the first presentation and generate
abstracted knowledge across presentations and thereby in-
fluence both what is learned and how well it is learned.
Conclusions
Comparison and remindings are both important cognitive
processes that allow us to generalize across similar
instances and generate new, abstracted knowledge. Remind-
ings inherently involve a comparison process. When
learners bring two episodes together in their mind, they
compare across them and attempt to create generalized
knowledge. While both comparison and reminding involve
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memory requirement about individual instances on learners
that comparison does not. The current experiments indi-
cate that the memory requirement of reminding (i.e.Table 1 Examples of proverbs used throughout the experiments. Ea
and middle columns were used. In Experiments 2 & 3, all three prov
Even fools stumble upon insight occasionally. Blind squirrels can sometimes
A bad workman blames his tools. An uncoordinated dancer acc
floor.
Two captains sink the ship. Into ruin falls a village with m
Don’t make clothes before the baby is born. Don’t heat the oil until the fis
To eat walnuts, you must crack some shells. Woodchips must fly when yo
The leopard can’t change his spots. A pig will always oink and ne
Drops gather one at a time to become an
ocean.
Pennies and pennies make p
pounds.
The fat man thinks no one is hungry. A liar expects everyone to lie
One key does not open every lock. No single plant grows in eve
Beer will quench your thirst if the wine barrels
run dry.
If the chair is broken, sit on th
Nothing ventured, nothing gained. If you do not enter the tiger’s
catch its cub.
It’s too late to cover the well when the child
is drowned.
Beating the drum is in vain a
He who has once burnt his mouth will forever
blow on his soup.
Bitten by a snake, afraid of th
As you make your bed, so must you lie in it. You shall harvest as you plan
I escaped the thunder but fell into lightning. Out of the frying pan, but int
Good knives cannot be forged from weak
steel.
Bad flour does not make goo
There are no fields without stones. Honey is sweet, but the bees
A monkey in silk is a monkey no less. A book with a fancy cover re
There’s no hearth like your own hearth. Dry bread at home is better t
abroad.
Dip from the well needlessly and it will go dry. Milk a cow too often and you
The branch that pokes out will be trimmed. The nail that sticks up will be
One rotten apple spoils the whole barrel. One bit of rat dung in the so
Different strokes suit different folks. One man’s meat is another m
He who sits next to a snake begins to slither. Those who sleep with dogs g
An empty vessel makes the most noise. It is not the sheep that baas
the most wool.
Even expensive silver will eventually tarnish. No rose stays red for a hundr
The shoemaker’s children often go barefoot. The smith’s horse is the wors
The strength of the seaman make the captain
succeed.
The servant’s toil makes the m
Who holds two watermelons in one hand
will drop both.
Going after two hares at the
allow the hares to escape.
Bigger roosters start to crow later. Larger pots boil slower.
Appendixretrieving the first presentation at the time of the second)
produces large mnemonic benefits for the individual in-
stances that can even support generalization of instances to
new, superficially dissimilar but deeply related instances.ch row shares a deep meaning. In Experiment 1, only the left
erbs were used
find an acorn. A broken clock is right twice a day.
uses an uneven A poor rower points to the oar.
any mayors. Too many midwives deliver a sickly baby.
h is on the bank. It’s not wheat until it’s been harvested.
u cut wood. You can’t make an omelet without breaking
some eggs.
ver purr. A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.
ounds and Hair by hair the head goes bald.
. If you sit in a hot bath, you believe the whole
town is warm.
ry soil. One instrument cannot play all the parts.
e footstool. Cake will satisfy when the pie is gone.
den, you cannot No sweet without sweat.
fter the party has ended. Closing the barn door is pointless once the
horse has escaped.
e rope for ten years. A burnt child dreads fire.
t. The forest echoes back just as you call into it.
o the fire. In fleeing the wolf, I ran into the bear.
d bread. You can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear.
sting. If you play with the cat, you must not mind her
scratch.
ads no better. A broom bound with silk sweeps as well as one
bound with string.
han roast meat East or west, home is best.
will draw blood. Load too much into a bag and it will rip.
hammered down. The tallest blade of grass is the first to be cut.
up ruins the pot. A spoonful of tar wrecks the entire jar of honey.
an’s poison. Trash to one is treasure to another.
et fleas. The friend of a thief becomes a thief.
the most that gives The hen that cackles loudest doesn’t always lay
the best eggs.
ed days. All good things must come to an end.
t shod. The man in town with the worst haircut is the
barber.
aster look good. The guts of the soldier make the general great.
same time will He with too many irons in the fire will ruin
them all.
Greater insights take longer to discover.
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